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INTRODUCTION
In the modern age of Western society, virtually every person moves
through life’s challenges with a presumption that every day practices
and procedures are lawful, harmless, and have been refined to avoid
personal danger. Indeed, when a couple goes to buy their first home,
they will place a presumptive trust in the loan officer at the local bank
who will educate them about acquiring a mortgage, and in the realtor
who will tend to every aspect of the home acquisition process. The
couple simply and unreservedly assumes that the law adequately
requires these professionals to protect the couple’s interests, to shield
them from harm, to prevent the incidence of damage and, most impor-
tantly, to keep them informed, unequivocally, to make proper decisions
throughout a process about which they know little.
Likewise, when this same couple conceives a child, they enter into
a realm in which they are completely inexperienced and are again
asked to place faith in numerous professionals. As these expectant
parents navigate through this unknown journey, they submit mother
and unborn child without reservation to a wide range of obstetrical
medications and practices, certain that they have absolutely nothing
about which to worry.
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As with most Americans, this expectant couple is operating on
a presumptive trust: a trust that they will learn everything they need
to know to make good choices for their growing family; a trust that
the mother and her unborn child’s care are the primary concerns of
her practitioners; and a trust that no information will be errantly ad-
vised or completely omitted from discussions, so as to endanger the
lives of mother or child. Unfortunately, this presumptive trust by our
expectant couple is grossly misplaced in the field of obstetrical care,
for there is a great deal of information left unsaid.
While the doctrine of informed consent1 has been continually
strengthened in the fields of traditional medicine by numerous judi-
cial decisions,2 the presence of the doctrine is virtually absent from
the field of obstetrics and gynecology.3 By virtually absent, it is meant
that the doctrine of informed consent has not been sufficiently delin-
eated, applied and required in the field of obstetrics.4 In the vast
majority of jurisdictions across the United States, there is no legal com-
pulsion placed upon an obstetrical practitioner to disclose anything
more than highly significant risks.5 Therefore, only the most egregious
1. The doctrine of informed consent is a legal requirement for medical professionals
that imposes upon a physician “the duty to explain the procedure to the patient and to
warn her of any material risks or dangers inherent in or collateral to the proposed
[practice or procedure], so as to enable the patient to make an intelligent and informed
choice about whether to follow her physician’s recommendation . . . .” Bankert v. United
States, 937 F. Supp. 1169, 1173 (D. Md. 1996). Accordingly, “[i]nformed consent is [pres-
ently] defined as ‘the willing and uncoerced acceptance’ of a medical intervention by a
patient after adequate disclosure by the physician of the nature of the intervention, its
risks and benefits, as well as of alternatives with their risks and benefits.” Id. (second
emphasis added). Perhaps the most obvious flaw with the doctrine is that only adequate
disclosure of risks to the patient is required. See id.
2. See, e.g., Curtis v. MRI Imaging Servs. II, 956 P.2d 960, 960, 962 (Or. 1998)
(finding that a physician may be held liable for not informing patients of the claustro-
phobic nature of the MRI process); Martin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Wis. 1995)
(holding physician liable for not informing parents of a child with a head injury after a
biking accident of the availability of a CAT scan).
3. The author does not intend to imply that the doctrine of informed consent does
not apply in obstetrics to establish a breach of the professional standard of care. Indeed,
such a cause of action may be maintained in all fifty states. See A Practical Guide to
Informed Consent, Background: Requirements for Informed Consent, TEMPLE U. HEALTH
SYS., http://www.templehealth.org/ICTOOLKIT/html/ictoolkitpage5.html (last visited
Mar. 30, 2012) (noting that all 50 states now have legislation requiring “some level of
informed consent”).
4. See Informed Consent, AM. CONGRESS OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. ON
ETHICS (Aug. 2009), http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/Committee_Opinions
/Committee_on_Ethics/Informed_Consent (explaining the difficulties and limitations of
the informed consent doctrine in obstetrics cases).
5. As of the date of this article, only three jurisdictions have extended the doctrine of
informed consent to such an extent in the field of obstetrics: Maryland, New Jersey, and
New York. Bankert, 937 F. Supp. at 1173; Draper v. Jasionowski, 858 A.2d 1141, 1148
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); Cicione v. Meyer, 823 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175–76 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2006).
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of failures to provide basic information to an expectant mother, which
result in physical injury to her or her child, are likely to result in
malpractice liability to the attending practitioner for want of informed
consent.6 Consequently, expectant mothers learn only a fraction of the
vital information necessary to make decisions about the various med-
ications, practices and procedures that are commonly a component of
their pregnancy.7
The position of this Note is clear as to what the doctrine of in-
formed consent should be in the field of obstetrics: a woman’s consent
to authorize an obstetric practice or procedure is not informed unless
she is provided with any and all information that is pertinent enough
to have an effect on her decision-making regarding whether to undergo
or forgo such a practice or procedure.8 The doctrine of informed con-
sent, however, must necessarily go beyond a duty to explain procedures
and warn patients of inherent risks or dangers.9 Indeed, informed
consent must require the provision of any and all information known
by the attending practitioner that is of such significant and perti-
nent substance that its awareness by the patient might have an effect
on the patient’s decision of whether to consent to a particular prac-
tice or procedure, or other medical alternative. Only then can consent
by obstetrics patients be truly informed.
Part I endeavors to explore the nature of the duty to inform in
obstetrics today. Given the vulnerability and the medical under-
sophistication of expectant mothers, Part I observes the legal issues
concerning the scope of informed consent, as applied to both the ex-
pectant mother and her child. The subject of bioethics is explored to
examine when the physician’s duty to inform should arise in the field
of obstetrics, particularly given the numerous opportunities during
6. See Bankert, 937 F. Supp. at 1170 (holding that physicians at a government-
operated hospital violated the mother’s right to informed consent by failing to inform her
of the risks of labor-inducing drugs and by not respecting her decision to deliver by
Cesarean section); see also Cicione, 823 N.Y.S.2d at 176 (reversing the jury’s verdict on
appeal and finding that the plaintiffs made out “a prima facie case on the issue of whether
Dr. Meyer adequately conveyed the reasonably foreseeable risks of the VBAC [vaginal
birth after Cesarean section] to Denise Cicione to permit her to make an informed decision,
and whether a reasonably prudent person would have elected to attempt the VBAC had
she been fully informed”).
7. See Wendy Woolery, Informed Consent Issues Throughout the Birthing Process,
21 J. LEGAL MED. 241, 255 (2000) (explicating the large information divide between prac-
titioner and patient).
8. This demonstrates that the doctrine of informed consent requires substantial
broadening so that physicians will be required to disclose more than just significant or
material risks. See Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 556–57 (Okla. 1979) (finding that
consent becomes informed once the patient knows all the material risks related to practice
or procedure at issue).
9. Woolery, supra note 7, at 242 (explaining that the modern standard of informed
consent “require[s] physicians to disclose all material risks to their patients”).
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pregnancy and labor in which the consent discussion should occur.
Further, Part I opines on the practice of off-labeling and the frequent
failure to disclose not only a drug’s effects on the fetus that are known
by medical professionals, but also concerning a drug’s “areas of uncer-
tainty” when consequences are unknown. Both practices operate in ob-
stetrics to inhibit a complete information exchange between the mother
and her practitioner, and ultimately serve to block efforts to reform ob-
stetrical practices by increasing the disclosure and dissemination of
vital information every woman needs to make an informed choice.
Part II demonstrates the direct and collateral consequences stem-
ming from the most common procedures during pregnancy and deliv-
ery, all of which have inherent dangers, but none of which are regularly
communicated from practitioner to patient. Exposed is the simple fact
that expectant mothers fail to receive a complete and comprehensive
discussion of underappreciated risks inherent to conventional obstet-
rical care because loopholes exist in the doctrine of informed consent
that permit this unacceptable silence in the informational exchange.
To paint the picture vividly, Part II walks through some of the various
prenatal, labor and delivery procedures, from the first prenatal visit
where volumes of information should be explained to the mother, all
the way to the trial of labor, where the self-serving economic policies
of hospitals and insurance companies virtually discourage the com-
plete disclosure of risks of common procedures.10 Identified here are
the dangers of the induction and delivery drugs, the dangers of EFMs
and ultrasound usage, and how both can lead to increased rates of
Cesarean sections and negative effects. The consequences resulting
from the botched information exchange are shocking; indeed, it is a
mother’s worst nightmare. Unfortunately, these consequences are
the price our society has chosen to pay by not compelling physicians
to disclose the dangers associated with commonly accepted obstetri-
cal medications, practices and procedures.
I. THE NATURE OF THE DUTY TO INFORM AND WHEN IT SHOULD ARISE
Underpinning the doctrine of informed consent is the simple prin-
ciple that patients11 are vulnerable and medically unsophisticated.12
10. See HENCI GOER, THE THINKING WOMAN’S GUIDE TO A BETTER BIRTH 16–17 (1999)
(exacting the economic forces from insurance companies and hospitals that drive phy-
sicians to push obstetric medications, practices and procedures in the interests of profit-
ability rather than patient necessity).
11. Uniquely in the field of obstetrics, the doctrine of informed consent has been
interpreted to protect both patients: mother and child. Draper v. Jasionowski, 858 A.2d
1141, 1148 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). An infant brought action against his mother’s
obstetrician and hospital for prenatal injuries he sustained during vaginal delivery that
arose out of the obstetrician’s alleged failure to obtain his mother’s informed consent
prior to delivery. Id.; see discussion infra Part I.B.
12. See Woolery, supra note 7, at 241, 255; see also Nancy K. Rhoden, Informed
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Implied within the doctrine, therefore, is that patients have a right to
know all the information and risks to inform their decision-making.13
To every extent imaginable, patients undeniably rely on the expertise
and forthrightness of their physicians and other attending profession-
als.14 Patients carry this expectation into prenatal visits with practi-
tioners.15 Additionally, patients carry this expectation when asked for
their blanket consent upon arriving at the hospital for delivery.16
Mothers certainly expect that the care of their unborn child is the ulti-
mate priority of the attending physicians.17 This patient expectation
permeates every level and stage of care in the field of obstetrics.18
Likewise, it should exist for every practice, procedure and medication.
A. The Pregnant Patient’s Bill of Rights
Acknowledging the expectations and rights of obstetrics patients,
maternity care pioneer and birth expert Doris B. Haire,19 while
Consent in Obstetrics: Some Special Problems, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 67, 67–69 (1987)
(recognizing the informational disadvantage between patient and practitioner).
13. See Rhoden, supra note 12, at 84–85 (espousing the idea that obstetricians
should provide as much information to patients as possible to ensure that decisions are
jointly made).
14. Id. at 68.
15. See id. at 68, 85. Rhoden even suggests that in the eyes of the expectant mother
“physicians’ typical approach to uncertainty or to a crisis may be perceived not as one
strategy among several, but as the only legitimate approach.” Id. at 68. Consequently,
expectant mothers “see the physician’s recommendation as the best or only hope for the
baby, and this viewpoint virtually guarantees acceptance of that recommendation, except
in cases of exceedingly firm beliefs on the part of the mother.” Id.
16. Attempts to seek a mother’s consent to medication, practices and procedures while
in, or beginning, her trial of labor should be considered invalid as it seems tantamount to
obtaining consent by duress. But see Bankert v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 1169, 1174
(D. Md. 1996) (finding the onset of labor did not by itself render a woman incompetent
to engage in decision-making); Rizzo v. Schiller, 445 S.E.2d 153, 155 (Va. 1994) (finding
the plaintiff was capable of making medical decisions even after being medicated with
delivery drugs).
17. See J. L. Reynolds, Great Expectations: The Doctor-Patient Relationship in Obstetrics,
35 CANADIAN FAM. PHYSICIAN 115, 115 (1989) (noting the high expectations that patients
have for obstetric services and their outcomes).
18. See id.
19. Doris B. Haire serves as president of the American Foundation for Maternal and
Child Health, which she founded with her husband John R. Haire, and is a former Chair
of the National Women’s Health Network. Doris B. Haire, CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION,
http://www.childbirthconnection.org/pop.asp?ck=10101 (last updated Aug. 15, 2007). She
has led the fight to increase research on the practices and effects of common obstetric
drugs on infant outcome and the child’s neurological development. Id. Her quest has
taken her to 72 countries to interview health professionals and to the halls of Congress
to give her testimony in three obstetrical practices proceedings for improvements to the
FDA’s drug regulating practices. Tellingly, Mrs. Haire was instrumental in the passage of
the New York Maternity Information Act. Id. The Act requires state hospitals to disclose
a myriad of obstetrical statistics and information. Legislation Affecting Maternity Care,
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President of the International Childbirth Education Association (ICEA),
published what has become “The Pregnant Patient’s Bill of Rights.”20
Contained within are sixteen enumerated and purported rights of
childbearing women.21 The first right of childbearing women appears
in substance to be a rendition of the doctrine of informed consent:
The Pregnant Patient has the right, prior to the administration of
any drug or procedure, to be informed by the health professional
caring for her of any potential direct or indirect effects, risks or haz-
ards to herself or her unborn or newborn infant which may result
from the use of a drug or procedure prescribed for or administered
to her during pregnancy, labor, birth, or lactation.22
Importantly, the remainder of the rights listed explicate the patient’s
access to information and medical records, patients’ safety for both
mother and child, and transparency in hospital and emergency medi-
cine practices and procedures.23 According to Professor George Annas,
chair of the Health Law Department at Boston University School of
Law, rights numbered “1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, and 14 can properly be la-
beled ‘legal rights,’ and most of the remainder, including 15 and 16,
can be labeled ‘probable legal rights.’”24 The import is clear: patients
and consumer advocates are endeavoring to supplement the doctrine
of informed consent as it pertains to obstetrical care to acknowledge
the rights of patient and child and thereby require physicians to in-
crease the information exchange and risk disclosure substantially.25
But why? What is wrong with the doctrine of informed consent in ob-
stetrics? Suffice it to say, far too much seemingly “material” informa-
tion is left unsaid and all too often results in serious physical harm
and/or death to both patients.
ALLIANCE FOR IMPROVEMENT MATERNITY SERVICES, http://www.aimsusa.org/laws.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
20. GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS: THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE
TO THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS app. at 375–77 (S. Ill. Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2004); The Pregnant
Patient’s Bill of Rights, ALLIANCE FOR IMPROVEMENT MATERNITY SERVICES, http://www.
aimsusa.org/ppbr.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
21. ANNAS, supra note 20, app. at 375–77.
22. Id. app. at 375.
23. Id. app. at 375–76.
24. Id. app. at 377.
25. See Understanding & Navigating the Maternity Care System: Informed Decision-
Making, CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION, http://www.childbirthconnection.org/article.asp?ck=
10081 (last updated Feb. 24, 2012) (noting that an improved standard of “shared decision
making” should replace the current informed consent doctrine in obstetrics (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
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B. Legal Limits on the Duty to Inform in Obstetrics
While the premise underlying the need for informed consent lies
in the vulnerability of expectant mothers, the premise underlying the
right of expectant women to enjoy informed consent is founded in a
principle equally as simple. Beginning with the bedrock principle that
only an expectant mother can be the true advocate for her unborn
child, it necessarily follows that practitioners and physicians must be
under the most complete duty to inform women of every risk attendant
in any drug or procedure administered. The courts seem to agree on
the first component of this simple premise.
In Modaber v. Kelley,26 a medical malpractice action was filed by
a mother against her physician for personal injuries and mental an-
guish due to the stillbirth of her child.27 In affirming that the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to support a finding that the obstetri-
cian’s conduct during the patient’s pregnancy “caused direct injury to
the [patient],”28 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the injury to
the unborn child constituted an injury to the mother and thus she
could recover damages.29 Similarly, in Castle v. Lester,30 a mother filed
a medical malpractice claim against the attending physician after her
child was born “neurologically impaired.”31 In affirming her $1.6 mil-
lion jury verdict,32 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that when an un-
born child sustains injuries from being born, both the mother and the
unborn child have causes of action against the negligent practitioner.33
Other courts outside the Commonwealth are in accord. In Hilsman
v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.,34 the Florida Fourth District Court of Ap-
peals confirmed that an injury to an unborn child was an injury to the
mother.35 In Spangler v. Bechtel,36 the Court of Appeals of Indiana held
that “a mother who suffers a stillbirth due to medical malpractice
qualifies as an injured patient” and is entitled to bring suit.37 Simi-
larly, in Smith v. Borello,38 the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded
26. 348 S.E.2d 233 (Va. 1986).
27. Id. at 233.
28. Id. at 236.
29. Id. at 237.
30. 636 S.E.2d 342 (Va. 2006).
31. Id. at 343.
32. Id. at 342.
33. See id. at 350 (noting that while the child does have a cause of action for its injuries,
it must be conducted separately from its mother’s cause of action).
34. 639 So. 2d 115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
35. Id. at 117.
36. 931 N.E.2d 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), vacated, 958 N.E.2d 458 (Ind. 2011).
37. Id. at 397.
38. 804 A.2d 1151 (Md. 2002).
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that a woman who loses her child in pregnancy may recover for de-
monstrable emotional distress in her own action for personal injuries.39
In Krishnan v. Sepulveda,40 the Texas Supreme Court permitted a
mother to recover for “mental anguish” caused by the stillbirth of her
child due to the negligence of her physician.41 That court reasoned that
the mother should recover from the physician because the negligence
was in treating the mother, and not the unborn child.42 The notion that
a women may recover on behalf of her unborn or stillborn child is
therefore well-established.43 A number of courts have additionally
recognized that when a child survives a negligently performed trial of
labor, even if only for a few days, the child or the child’s estate may sue
independently of the mother and any claims she might have against
the physician.
In Kalafut v. Gruver,44 the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded
that so long as the child is born alive, a physician who causes harm to
the child while in utero is subject to liability to the child or child’s
estate (as well as the mother) for tortious conduct causing injury.45 In
Gonzales v. Mascarenas,46 the Colorado Court of Appeals held that a
child who is born alive and subsequently dies is entitled to bring suit
independently of its mother against the negligent practitioner.47 In
Miccolis v. AMICA Mutual Insurance Co.,48 the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island concluded that a child born alive is entitled to bring
suit for injuries caused by tortious conduct that occurred both before
and after conception.49 Similarly, in Draper v. Jasionowski,50 New
Jersey’s Appellate Division held that an infant, on reaching the age of
majority, has an independent cause of action against its mother’s ob-
stetrician for any prenatal injuries.51 Furthermore, in Schreiber v.
Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin,52 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
specifically recognized the right of a child born alive to recover for
injuries suffered as a result of the obstetrician’s failure to offer its
39. Id. at 1163.
40. 916 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1995).
41. Id. at 482.
42. Id. at 479–80.
43. See id.
44. 389 S.E.2d 681 (Va. 1990).
45. Id. at 683–84.
46. 190 P.3d 826 (Colo. App. 2008).
47. Id. at 830.
48. 587 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1991).
49. Id. at 69.
50. 858 A.2d 1141 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
51. Id. at 1142.
52. 588 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. 1999).
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mother a Cesarean section.53 Courts have clearly embraced the concept
that a mother can truly be the only advocate for her unborn child, and,
once born, the child may be its own independent advocate.
Despite this progressive thinking by our nation’s judiciary, courts
have failed to make the leap in applying these principles to establish
a broader, more comprehensive, doctrine of informed consent.54 Indeed,
tying the innate role women play in being responsible for their unborn
child to the notion that physicians be required to divulge the whole
truth, even if it is unknown, has escaped our judiciary. Although liabil-
ity will apply in cases of egregious physician misconduct, it remains
virtually impossible for plaintiffs to demonstrate a deviation from the
standard of care for failing to disclose risks and information concerning
obstetric procedures.55 This is because the standard of care is being set,
for better or for worse, by obstetricians acting in concert with one an-
other.56 If all the obstetricians remain silent during the information
exchange on key risks, the standard of care reflects that silence and
necessarily leaves mother and child in the dark, unprotected, and with-
out malpractice recourse.
If courts are only willing to require the disclosure of “material”
risks, perhaps the fight here is in advocating that the definition of
“materiality” be construed to truly encompass all risks which truly
might cause an expectant mother to forego a recommended drug or
procedure. Logically, therefore, if courts should be expected to apply
a more broad and comprehensive doctrine of informed consent, a dis-
cussion is required of when the duty to inform should arise.
C. Bioethics: When Should the Duty to Inform Arise?
Professor George Annas observes that while bioethics should
govern the conduct of physicians in patient care decisions, it has “little
impact on actual physician practice.”57 One reason may be because the
laws governing informed consent in healthcare and obstetrics, which
are almost exclusively state laws and federal enactments like the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), “are
53. Id. at 26, 34–35.
54. See Bankert v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 1169, 1182 (D. Md. 1996) (ruling that
the doctrine of informed consent, as applied in obstetrics, extends only to require that
physicians disclose those risks or dangers that are material to an expectant mother).
55. See id. (laying out the three-pronged objective test that must be satisfied in order
for a patient to prove an informed consent violation).
56. See Rhoden, supra note 12, at 72 (explaining the collective obstetrical practice of
refusing to admit uncertainty to patients).
57. GEORGE J. ANNAS, AMERICAN BIOETHICS: CROSSING HUMAN RIGHTS AND HEALTH
LAW BOUNDARIES 95 (2005).
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aberrations to this rule.”58 The lack of uniformity in state laws and ju-
dicial case law may be the reason why the idea of patients’ rights “re-
main[s] foreign to many physicians.”59
As Professor Annas notes, “some physicians seem to believe that
they can follow their own ethical compass without regard to the law.”60
Given the currently weak state of the doctrine of informed consent in
obstetrics, a physician need not do much to comport with applicable
state law and judicial precedent on the subject. The inquiry of the mo-
ment is when the duty to inform should arise and how to know when
consent is truly informed. Without a doubt, it should certainly arise
and protect before “[b]eing killed in a hospital where you went for care,
or by a drug you took for [a] cure.”61
The duty to inform in obstetrics should arise in every context prior
to a medical procedure or drug administration in which the expec-
tant mother is in a competent mental state. The reason relates back
to the expectant mother’s dual role.62 Not only does any medication
or procedure affect her, it necessarily affects her unborn child. Given
that the mother is the only true advocate for her child, informed con-
sent should be omnipresent in the context of obstetrical care.
Informed consent means that in any given medical context, wheth-
er during prenatal care, labor or delivery, the expectant mother has
been informed of the following: the name and nature of a particular
procedure or drug and why she should allow the procedure or drug to
be administered to her and her unborn child;63 the dangers or disad-
vantages to her and her unborn child of not receiving the procedure or
drug;64 the existence of other methods of treatment available to her
and her unborn child; the risks and benefits of these other methods to
her and her unborn child;65 the benefits or advantages of this proce-
dure or drug as it applies to both her and the unborn child;66 an under-
standing of her physician’s experience in providing these procedures
or drugs to people similarly situated;67 her prognosis, and the likely
58. Id.
59. Id. at 104.
60. Id.
61. GEORGE J. ANNAS, WORST CASE BIOETHICS: DEATH, DISASTER, AND PUBLIC HEALTH
163 (2010).
62. See Rhoden, supra note 12, at 76 (“It is quite obvious that decisionmaking in ob-
stetrics differs from decisionmaking in other areas of medicine, in that only in obstetrics
is one patient within and dependent upon another.” (emphasis added)).
63. ANNAS, supra note 20, at 134.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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outcome to her and her unborn child following the administration of
the procedure or drug;68 and all areas of uncertainty (gaps in medical
knowledge) associated with the administration of the drug or proce-
dure that are known by the physician. The expectant mother must also
have had the opportunity to ask all questions with “a clear head and
alert mind”;69 have a belief that the benefits from receiving a proce-
dure or drug “outweigh the risks” to her and her unborn child;70 and
understand that there is no obstetric related drug that has been prov-
en safe for the fetus during the pregnancy or at term.71
Even in the advocate’s ideal view of informed consent, there would
still exist two well-established justifications for withholding informa-
tion from the expectant mother: (1) exigent circumstances “in which im-
mediate treatment is needed to preserve the [mother and/or child’s] life
or health and the patient is unconscious or incompetent and there is no
time to locate a family member or other decision maker”;72 and (2)
waiver of informed consent, in which the mother elects not “to know the
specific risks and, understanding that there are risks of death . . . , asks
not to be informed of them in detail.”73 In the case of the latter, the ex-
pectant mother might be asked to sign such a waiver on behalf of her-
self and her unborn child.74
By no means, however, should the use of general or “blanket” con-
sent forms be advocated. Blanket consent forms are often utilized by
practitioners and authorize them to perform and administer a wide
variety of procedures and drugs deemed necessary in their own discre-
tion.75 “A blanket consent form,” by its very nature, “covers . . . almost
everything a doctor or a hospital might do to a patient, without men-
tioning anything specifically.”76 According to Professor Annas, “[m]any
68. Id.
69. See ANNAS, supra note 20, at 134–35.
70. Id. at 135.
71. Letter from Dr. Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S.
Food & Drug Admin., to Doris B. Haire, President, Am. Found. for Maternal & Child
Health (June 11, 2001) (on file with author). According to Dr. Woodcock, in response to a
request from the American Foundation for Maternal and Child Health for a copy of the
Standards of Safety that must be met before the FDA approves a drug to be used in obstet-
rics, “[t]here are no written standards for safety assessments of drugs approved for obstet-
rics indications.” Id. Despite a growing concern that fetal exposure to obstetric drugs may
result in neuroapoptosis, and subsequent autism in the exposed offspring, it is frightening
to see that the FDA has shown little interest in curbing or minimizing such fetal exposure.
72. ANNAS, supra note 20, at 127.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Woolery, supra note 7, at 253; see also Rizzo v. Schiller, 445 S.E.2d 153, 155–56
(Va. 1994).
76. ANNAS, supra note 20, at 129.
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hospitals continue to require patients to sign such forms on admis-
sion.”77 While in theory a blanket consent form is not sufficient con-
sent for any procedure with “risks or alternatives,”78 it would not be a
far stretch to posit that physicians may be getting incentivized to take
advantage of blanket consent forms signed by the expectant mother in
an effort to perform procedures and administer drugs to increase per-
sonal and hospital profit.79
When the duty to inform ideally should arise is a far cry from
where the duty to inform indeed arises.80 Perhaps this is because
physicians argue they are disadvantaged by the uncertainty of know-
ing “what risks should be disclosed.”81 What is inherently unfortu-
nate about this standpoint is that it makes clear the fundamental
weakness of the doctrine of informed consent as applied to obstetrics:
a physician is not legally required to disclose every risk of every drug
or procedure.82 This is certainly not because the expectant mother is
disinterested. In fact, it would be hard to believe that an expectant
mother would be indifferent if she knew her physician was aware of
risks associated with a drug or procedure and failed to convey them to
her. Perhaps the only saving grace for expectant mothers currently is
that physicians must present the information in language the mother
can understand.83
D. The Practice of Off-Labeling
Although Pfizer or Merck might try to convey that off-label uses
are benefits that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
yet to recognize, in truth, off-labeling is the physician practice of pre-
scribing drugs for uses, dosages and applications presently unapproved
by the FDA.84 As Consumer Reports aptly observes, “[l]ike most
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Henci Goer, The Soaring Cesarean Rate: It’s the Economics, Stupid, SCI. &
SENSIBILITY (May 22, 2009), http://www.scienceandsensibility.org/?p=189 (discussing how
Cesareans generate large profits for hospitals and, as a consequence, there is not a lot
of incentive to reduce them regardless of the fact that they can have a negative effect on
mothers and babies).
80. See Bankert v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 1169, 1182 (D. Md. 1996) (ruling that the
doctrine of informed consent, as applied in obstetrics, extends only to require that phy-
sicians disclose those risks or dangers that are material to an expectant mother).
81. ANNAS, supra note 20, at 116.
82. See id. (observing that the only risks that physicians are required to disclose are
those which are material).
83. Id. at 117.
84. Off-Label Drug Prescribing: What Does It Mean For You?, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG
(May 2009), http://www.consumerreports.org/health/best-buy-drugs/off-label-drug-prescribing-
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Americans, you probably assume that if your doctor writes a prescrip-
tion for you, the drug is approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration for your specific condition or ailment.”85 Of course, you would
be very wrong.
Physicians in all areas of practice write, as often as one out of ev-
ery five, prescriptions for off-label uses.86 While off-labeling is not re-
stricted by law and can be beneficial,87 often there is not conclusive
research supporting a particular off-label use,88 and the effects can be
devastating.89 Even more shocking, while physicians may elect to dis-
cuss off-label uses with patients, they are under no legal obligation to
disclose that the prescription being written is for an off-label use.90
Drugs in obstetrics are no different, and many of the drugs that com-
monly are prescribed prenatally or during labor are written off-label,
some with horrific obstetric implications.91
Prozac, which is an antidepressant for oral administration, is not
FDA approved for pregnancy, labor, or delivery, but is frequently pre-
scribed to, and taken by, expectant mothers.92 The manufacturer’s
package insert indicates that when Prozac is administered to an ex-
pectant mother, it “crosses the placenta” and enters the fetal circulatory
system, meaning it “may have adverse effects on the newborn.”93 The
insert further advises that “[Prozac] should be used during labor and
delivery only if the potential benefit justifies the potential risk to the
what-does-it-mean-for-you-5-09/overview/off-label-drug -prescribing.htm.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Robert H. Pritchard, Off-Label Uses of Approved Drugs: A New Compromise Is
Needed, LEDA AT HARV. L. SCH. (Mar. 25, 1999), http://www.leda.law.harvard.edu/leda
/data/130/rpritcha.html (“[I]t cannot be denied that serious harm can occur when
physicians and manufacturers abuse their bounded powers with regard to off-label drug
therapies.”); see also Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—Rethinking the
Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427–28 (2008) (detailing the negative
consequences and numerous conflicts surrounding off-label drug use).
90. Off-Label Drug Prescribing: What Does it Mean for You?, supra note 84.
91. See Drugs Not FDA Approved for Obstetrics, ALLIANCE FOR IMPROVEMENT
MATERNITY SERVICES, http://www.aimsusa.org/ObstetricDrugs-NotApproved.htm (last
visited Mar. 30, 2012) (providing a long list of drugs that are commonly used off-label in
obstetric care).
92. Id.; Anne Harding, Antidepressant Use in Pregnancy May Raise Autism Risk, CNN
HEALTH (July 6, 2011, 9:22 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/07/04/antidepressant
.pregnancy.autism.risk/index.html (highlighting that a large study in 2005 found that
6.5 percent of pregnant women were taking antidepressants such as Prozac); Prozac
(Fluoxetine Hydrochloride) Capsule, DAILY MED, http://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed
/drugInfo.cfm?id=62256 (last updated Jan. 2012) (“The effect of PROZAC on labor and
delivery in humans is unknown.”).
93. See Prozac (Fluoxetine Hydrochloride) Capsule, supra note 92.
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fetus.”94 And yet, there is no legal requirement for a physician to speak
a word of this to the expectant mother.95 Consequently, most do not.96
Similarly, Valium, which is approved for the management of anxi-
ety disorders, is not approved for use in obstetrics.97 The package insert
for Valium indicates that “[s]pecial care must be taken when Valium
is used during labor and delivery, as high single doses may produce
irregularities in the fetal heart rate and hypotonia, poor sucking,
hypothermia, and moderate respiratory depression in the [newborn
children].”98 The insert further provides that physicians should advise
patients of the desirability of ceasing use of the drug if the patient be-
comes pregnant or expects to become pregnant.99 Although the manu-
facturer advisory is certainly a good one, there is no legal compulsion
requiring physicians to disclose this information regarding Valium to
the expectant mother.100 Moreover, there is nothing restricting a phy-
sician from writing a prescription for Valium to an expectant mother.
Prostin E2 (Dinoprostone), which is commonly prescribed to an
expectant mother in labor to prepare the cervix for birth, is also not
approved for pregnancy, labor or delivery.101 The manufacturer cau-
tions that “PROSTIN E2 Vaginal Suppository should [not] be used for
cervical ripening”102 (“a process in which the drug causes the cervix to
soften, efface and dilate”).103 Yes, that is right, the manufacturer strong-
ly cautions against the drug’s most common off-label use. Should our
hypothetical couple be concerned yet?
Mepergan (Meperidine HCl/Prometh HCl) is also a narcotic anal-
gesic often used in obstetrics.104 The package insert cautions that when
used as an obstetric analgesic, “Meperidine crosses the placental bar-
rier and can produce [respiratory] depression . . . in the newborn.”105
94. Id.
95. Off-Label Drug Prescribing: What Does it Mean for You?, supra note 84.
96. See Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened
Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 480 (2009) (“A 2006
poll suggests that much of the U.S. public is confused and ambivalent about off-label pre-
scribing, with about half the respondents believing that physicians are permitted to pre-
scribe drugs only for on-label indications and about half believing that physicians should
be prohibited from prescribing drugs for off-label indications.” (footnote omitted)).
97. Drugs Not FDA Approved for Obstetrics, supra note 91.
98. Valium (Diazepam) Tablet, DAILY MED, http://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed
/drugInfo.cfm?id=18533 (last updated Apr. 2010).
99. Id.
100. Off-Label Drug Prescribing: What Does It Mean For You?, supra note 84.
101. Dinoprostone, PUBMED HEALTH (Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmedhealth/PMH0000698; Drugs Not FDA Approved For Obstetrics, supra note 91.
102. Prostin E2 (Dinoprostone) Suppository, DAILY MED, http://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov
/dailymed/drugInfo.cfm?id=451 (last updated May 2006).
103. Drugs Not FDA Approved For Obstetrics, supra note 91.
104. Id.
105. Meperidine HCL (Meperidine Hydrochloride) Tablet, DAILY MED, http://dailymed
.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/drugInfo.cfm?id=3790 (last updated Mar. 2007).
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The insert further alerts that “resuscitation [of the newborn] may be re-
quired.”106 While Mepergan is not approved for use in labor or delivery,
presently there is no legal requirement preventing physicians from
administering this drug during labor or delivery.107
Sadly, the list goes on.108 Although off-label uses can be beneficial
to patients, the foregoing discussion obviates the need for regulation
of off-label uses and greater disclosure through a stronger duty to in-
form. Clearly, practitioners should be required to engage expectant
mothers in a dialogue regarding the nature and frequency of off-label
use during pregnancy, labor, and delivery. Further, lawyers must re-
peatedly move courts in this direction and bring malpractice actions for
medical damages brought on by off-label uses accompanied by a fail-
ure to inform.
E. The FDA’s Areas of Uncertainty
As horrific as the reality of off-labeling is, the reality is not much
better even for drugs that carry FDA approval in obstetric applications.
One reason for this could be because “[t]he FDA does not guarantee the
safety of any drug.”109 According to Doris Haire, what this means is
that “no prescription drug or over-the-counter remedy . . . is without
risk, even when taken according to directions.”110 Thus, when inform-
ing a patient that a drug is safe, a physician is not using the common
dictionary definition of the word “safe”: “free from harm or injury,” as
the patient might otherwise imagine.111 Rather, the physician simply
means that the drug comes with an acceptable risk, measured not
against the expectant mother’s standards of acceptability, but upon the
assessments of a non-stakeholder: the FDA.112 This is especially true in
the field of obstetrics.113
Perhaps the other reason, even with drugs that do carry the un-
persuasive FDA approval in obstetric applications, is that many of
these drugs’ medical effects and consequences on the unborn or
106. Id.
107. See Off-Label Drug Prescribing: What Does It Mean For You?, supra note 84.
108. See Drugs Not FDA Approved for Obstetrics, supra note 91 (providing a compre-
hensive list of drugs frequently used “off-label” in obstetrics).
109. Letter from Dr. J. Richard Crout, Dir., Bureau of Drugs, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
to Doris B. Haire (Jan. 15, 1975) (on file with author).
110. Doris Haire, Just How Safe Is “Safe”? How the F.D.A. Determines the “Safety” of
Drugs, ALLIANCE FOR IMPROVEMENT MATERNITY SERVICES, http://www.aimsusa.org/howsafe
.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
111. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id.
113. See id. (noting that the “FDA has no [established] system for accurately determining
the benefit/risk ratio of an obstetric drug for the offspring”).
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newborn child are unknown or inconclusive.114 When gaps in medical
knowledge exist concerning a drug’s effect in a particular context, such
as a drug’s effect on fetal development, these unknown consequences
have been denominated by the FDA as “areas of uncertainty.” To pro-
tect consumers from “areas of uncertainty,” Section 201.57(c)(9)(ii) of
Volume 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides:
If the drug has a recognized use during labor or delivery (vaginal
or abdominal delivery), whether or not the use is stated in the
Indications and Usage section, this subsection must describe the
available information about the effect of the drug on the mother
and the fetus, on the duration of labor or delivery, on the possi-
bility that forceps delivery or other intervention or resuscitation
of the newborn will be necessary, and the effect of the drug on the
later growth, development, and functional maturation of the child.
If any information required under this subsection is unknown, it
must state that the information is unknown.115
This regulation requires drug manufacturers to disclose in its package
insert a drug’s effects on the fetus when the drug has a recognized use
in labor or delivery and, if a drug’s fetal effects are unknown, manufac-
turers are required to acknowledge the particular areas of uncertain-
ty.116 But, as with off-label uses, it appears present law imposes no
obligation upon obstetricians to notify an expectant mother that the
drugs she may be taking, or having administered, come with areas
of uncertainty, unless the risks are objectively “material.”117 The
results seem inconsistent. If the FDA believes it is necessary to warn
consumers by requiring package inserts to state fetal effects and
areas of uncertainty associated with a particular drug, the disclosure
of this information should also be required by the doctrine of informed
consent when a physician engages in the colloquy with a patient,
114. See FDA Approved Obstetrics Drugs: Their Effects on Mother and Baby, ALLIANCE
FOR IMPROVEMENT MATERNITY SERVICES, http://www.aimsusa.org /obstetricdrugs.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2012) (observing that no conclusive studies on Pitocin have ever been
produced that identify the long-term effects of the drug on the baby); Haire, supra note 110
(stressing that there is “[n]o FDA requirement that obstetric drugs be proven safe for the
fetus or newborn”); Prozac (Fluoxetine Hydrochloride) Capsule, supra note 92 (“The effect
of PROZAC on labor and delivery in humans is unknown.”).
115. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(9)(ii) (2006) (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. This author was unable to find a single malpractice case seeking to recover damages
stemming from injuries arising out of the areas of uncertainty of a drug brought on by the
administration of that drug, which was a result of the obstetrician’s failure to inform re-
garding those areas of uncertainty.
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recommending a particular course of action, procedure, or drug. Are
areas of uncertainty not material risks?
Marcaine (Bupivacaine), for example, is a drug commonly used in
epidurals and is approved by the FDA for use in obstetrics.118 In the in-
sert for Marcaine, the manufacturer cautions that use on patients dur-
ing uterine contractions “is not recommended.”119 Marcaine is also not
recommended for use on mothers who are under the age of eighteen.120
Most importantly, the FDA package insert states, “[t]here are no ad-
equate and well-controlled studies in pregnant women of the effect of
[Marcaine] on the developing fetus. [Marcaine] should be used during
pregnancy only if the potential benefit justifies the potential risk to the
fetus.”121 In this realistic example, but for the obstetrician’s disclosure,
how else would an expectant mother know about Marcaine’s areas of
uncertainty? Is this information not “objectively material?”122 Might
the disclosure of this drug information cause the typical expectant
mother to decline an epidural?
What is truly remarkable is that despite the simplicity of the idea
that only a mother can be her unborn child’s advocate, and the natu-
ral progression of the idea that in order to advocate a mother must be
completely informed, courts have remained unwilling to extend the
doctrine of informed consent beyond material risks to the mother.123 As
a result, off-labeling and the failure to discuss significant areas of un-
certainty have become commonplace, particularly in the field of obstet-
rics.124 This abstraction of the doctrine of informed consent thus far,
however, does not adequately portray obstetricians’ missed opportuni-
ties to truly inform a mother of many seemingly material risks. It is the
absence of a strong duty to inform in the field of obstetrics that leaves
much unsaid, and often with nightmarish consequences. Endeavoring
118. FDA Approved Obstetric Drugs: Their Effects on Mother and Baby, supra note 114;
Obstetric Drugs: Their Effects on Mother and Infant, ALLIANCE FOR IMPROVEMENT
MATERNITY SERVICES, http://www.aimsusa.org/rothdrug.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
119. Bupivacaine (Bupivacaine Hydrochloride) Injection, Solution, DAILY MED,
http://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/drugInfo.cfm?id=49075 (last visited Mar. 30, 2012)
(emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Bankert v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 1169, 1182 (D. Md. 1996) (asserting that
physicians must disclose to patients “material risks or dangers inherent in or collateral to”
the administration of a drug).
123. See id. (emphasizing that the doctrine of informed consent requires only the dis-
closure of material risks or dangers to a patient).
124. Dresser & Frader, supra note 96, at 482; see also M.S. Henry, Uncertainty,
Responsibility, and the Evolution of the Physician/Patient Relationship, 32 J. INST. MED.
ETHICS 321, 321 (2006) (noting that a study of the informed consent process found that
uncertainty was disclosed to patients only five percent of the time).
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to paint this picture as vividly as possible, we once again return to our
hypothetical expectant parents.
II. MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR INFORMED CONSENT DURING THE
BIRTHING PROCESS AND THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES
Our quest begins with the stigmatized importance of finding an ob-
stetrician upon learning of pregnancy. As a product of Western society,
our expectant couple is conditioned that getting an obstetrician is es-
sentially a rite of passage upon conception of a child.125 But rarely
would they ever know to challenge that notion and ask whether alter-
natives exist. Indeed, alternatives to a “normal” hospital birth,126 such
as the midwifery profession or even a natural home birth, are seem-
ingly left unconsidered.127 The beginning of this vicious cycle appears
to be the blind, presumptive trust that we instinctively place in our ob-
stetrical practitioners.128 As a result, our expectant couple quickly loses
control and, from this point, the odds that they will ever make truly in-
formed decisions are incredibly slim.
A. The Laughable Information Exchange
Once in the office with their obstetrician, a laughable information
exchange takes place because obstetricians are in a business built on
happy patients, not informed ones.129 As our expectant mother gives the
doctor an oral medical history, and perhaps expresses her interest in
giving birth to her child naturally and without drugs, the physician
tells the expectant mother what she wants to hear and gives shallow
125. From the motion picture portrayals of pregnancy, delivery and birth, to celebra-
tions by our co-workers, family and friends, a theme is clear. Often portrayed is the ultra-
sound procedure during pregnancy, the eagerness to distribute ultrasound photos, and the
attending obstetrician in the hospital telling the mother “everything’s A-OK.” Of course,
these moments are well engrained into the American psyche because these are the norms
of our culture—a culture without an effective doctrine of informed consent.
126. The irony is of course that by “normal” birth, society often thinks of a birth in a hos-
pital by the attending obstetrician. To those in the field of maternity and obstetric care,
however, a “normal” birth is a natural birth, and a natural birth can only be assured when
a midwife has been engaged to deliver the child. See GOER, supra note 10, at 209 (empha-
sizing that in hospitals, birth is approached as “a medical crisis,” whereas births at birthing
centers or at home are normal and healthy).
127. Id. at 201. For further discussion on midwifery, see id. at 200–18 (making the case
for the continued role of midwifery in the modern age).
128. This is a theory posited by the author and is not known to have been suggested by
another source.
129. See, e.g., Woolery, supra note 7, at 245 (describing the specificity with which pa-
tients must object to the use of forceps when there has been informed consent present in
a previous procedure).
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assurances:130 “Oh, we should definitely be able to do a natural birth,
and everything should be fine.” But, for some reason, the conversation
stops here. Again, another opportunity is missed for the real conversa-
tion about hospitals, procedures, labor, delivery and drugs.131
The obstetrician should have been frank with our expectant par-
ents about the realities of the situation, beyond simply ascertaining the
mother’s medical history and desire for a natural birth. Expectant par-
ents need the truth. The truth is that the reality of a natural birth, for
a first-time mother, is not a likely reality when a hospital birth is elect-
ed.132 This is largely because hospitals injudiciously administer drugs
to expectant mothers.133 How can they do this? What expectant par-
ents are not being told is that when the mother is eventually admitted
to the hospital at term, she will likely sign a blanket consent form that
enables the doctors to do anything from clipping her toenails to giving
her a Cesarean section.134 Further, our expectant couple is not told that
many legal hospital policies authorize physicians to medically intervene
if the pregnancy does not progress “properly.”135
B. Economics and Cesareans
By “properly,” one may have thought the meaning to be whatever
is in the best interests of mother and child. Sadly, by “properly,” what
is meant is profitably.136 All too often, under the authority of the blan-
ket consent form, hospitals actually encourage their doctors to perform
legal, but unnecessary obstetrical procedures covered by insurance in
order to increase patients’ bills and maximize hospital profit from the
insurance companies.137
Hospitals also put economics over patient care by stacking the
deck against patients and increasing the likelihood that “[they]’ll need
130. See, e.g., id. at 245–46 (citing a case in which a doctor used forceps during delivery
before the mother could ask questions); see also GOER, supra note 10, at 1–3 (explicating
the gap between patient belief and practitioner reality).
131. See Woolery, supra note 7, at 245–46.
132. Id. at 242; see also GOER, supra note 10, at 16–17 (articulating that the profitability
to hospitals of Cesarean sections and delivery drug usage reduces a mother’s chance of
having a natural birth).
133. GOER, supra note 10, at 205.
134. See Woolery, supra note 7, at 253–54 (indicating the prominent use of the blanket
or general consent form and how its use does not appear to absolve physicians from all
liability for lack of informed consent).
135. ANNAS, supra note 20, at 127. Unfortunately, when interventions become routine
under the authority of blanket consent forms, then there is really no medical reason for
them. GOER, supra note 10, at 205.
136. GOER, supra note 10, at 16–17.
137. Goer, supra note 79.
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the drugs.”138 After all, if drugs are administered during the trial of
labor, insurance will pay for them and the hospitals will make more
money than if an expectant mother had a natural birth and did not
need them.139 At least, that is what our expectant parents should
have been told.
Henci Goer, an award winning medical writer and birth activist,
suggests that unnecessary Cesarean sections are performed because
they add thousands of dollars to the patient’s hospital bill,140 and are
procedures for which insurers will, and do, pay.141 In a study by Myers
and Gleicher, when a hospital’s “cesarean rate [was reduced] from
17.5% to 11.5% over two years, the hospital lost $1 million in reve-
nue.”142 Unfortunately, Cesarean sections come with their own set of
risks and have become an epidemic.143
Between 1970 and the mid-1990s, the number of women who gave
birth by Cesarean has grown exponentially from 5.5%144 (about one
in eighteen) to an average of 24% (about one in four).145 According
to Henci Goer, this makes “Cesarean section . . . the most common
operation performed in the [United States].”146 While arguably the in-
crease could be attributable to the fact that the Cesarean section
procedure itself is now rather low risk, this is not an accurate or com-
plete explanation.
Cesareans, as surgical procedures, can be scheduled, permitting
the element of convenience to enter obstetrics.147 With families being
more geographically spread out in the age of modern travel, scheduled
deliveries are more popular.148 And because Cesarean sections can be
scheduled, obstetricians are led “to exaggerate the problems of vaginal
birth and minimize those of cesarean delivery.”149 Certainly, expectant
parents would want to learn that “obstetricians are less likely to per-
form cesareans late at night or on weekends” because the procedure
is often scheduled for the physician’s convenience.150
138. Yvonne Brackbill, Introduction, MONOGRAPHS SOC’Y FOR RES. CHILD DEV., June
1970, at 1, 1.
139. See GOER, supra note 10, at 16–17.
140. See Goer, supra note 79.
141. See id.
142. HENCI GOER, OBSTETRIC MYTHS VERSUS RESEARCH REALITIES: A GUIDE TO THE
MEDICAL LITERATURE 24 (1995).
143. GOER, supra note 10, at 11.
144. GOER, supra note 142, at 21.
145. Id.
146. Id. (citation omitted); see also GOER, supra note 10, at 11.
147. GOER, supra note 10, at 17–18.
148. See, e.g., id. at 17 (identifying “[c]onvenience” as a reason for the increased rates
of Cesareans).
149. Id. at 13.
150. Id. at 17–18.
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Perhaps the most common reason that women have Cesareans is
simply because they have already had one.151 Many obstetricians be-
lieve that vaginal birth after Cesarean is “too dangerous.”152 Patients
who have had Cesarean sections are at higher risk for uterine rupture,
cephalopelvic disproportion, and failure to progress, all of which will
put the unborn child in distress.153 As a result, many hospitals will not
permit the mother to have a normal vaginal birth after a Cesarean sec-
tion, not because her body cannot handle it, but because insurance will
not cover the delivery unless it is by Cesarean section.154 This means
the normal woman is virtually uninsurable for normal birth following
a Cesarean section.155
While clearly a majority of Cesareans are performed absent medi-
cal necessity, and have earned popularity from the convenience factor,
cesareans are not without negatives. Cesareans are painful, debilitat-
ing and require a longer recovery period than a vaginal birth.156 More-
over, each of these complicating factors necessarily interferes with the
bonding process between mother and baby.157
Cesareans also carry risks for the baby, not the least of which is
that the newborn may be cut.158 Because most Cesareans are performed
after administering an epidural drug to the mother, such as Marcaine
(Bupivacaine), the drug is certain to be passed through the blood-
stream to the child prior to the procedure.159 Because there are no
adequate or well controlled studies on the effects of Marcaine on the
fetus, a real risk is being taken during the Cesarean section proce-
dure.160 Certainly, the foregoing seems like the type of information an
obstetrician should pass onto its patients. Why is our expectant couple
not being told these facts?
C. The Unnatural Amniotomy
Another procedure from whose details expectant parents are likely
to be insulated is the amniotomy procedure. This procedure involves
151. GOER, supra note 142, at 23.
152. Id. at 23–24.
153. Heidi Rinehart, A VBAC Primer: Technical Issues for Midwives, MIDWIFERY TODAY
(2001), www.midwiferytoday.com/articles/vbacprimer.asp.
154. GOER, supra note 10, at 162–63.
155. See id. at 47 (warning patients that “[y]ou may find that your insurance plan does
not include anyone who does vaginal breech births”).
156. Id. at 22.
157. Id. (reporting that many women experience difficulty in looking after the baby
during recovery).
158. Id. at 23.
159. Bupivacaine (Bupivacaine Hydrochloride) Injection, Solution, supra note 119.
160. Id.
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the forced breaking of the water, or amniotic sac membrane, in which
the fetus is encased.161 To break, the doctor will snag the membrane
with an amnihook tool, causing the sac to rupture and the amniotic
fluid to drain.162 The procedure is often uncomfortable for the mother,
but does not inflict physical pain on the child.163 Unfortunately, “[m]any
[obstetricians] consider amniotomy so trivial that they may not think
to advise you that they are about to do one.”164
An amniotomy can shorten labor by one or two hours.165 Some ob-
stetricians hail it as a less risky alternative to inducing labor through
the use of drugs, but this is misleading as both methods are unnat-
ural.166 Obstetricians are also aware that the absence of amniotic fluid
has been associated with abnormalities in the fetal heart rate.167 If the
membranes are intact, the baby and the umbilical cord will remain in
a suspended state of floating.168 But without the fluid, the fetus loses
its insulation and uterine contractions may impede blood flow to the
newborn.169 Further, an amniotomy can result in umbilical cord pro-
lapse, in which the cord precedes the baby from the birth canal.170 Um-
bilical cord prolapse is an emergency requiring immediate Cesarean
section to get oxygen to the newborn.171
Unfortunately, while all of this information is known to practitio-
ners, it is unlikely to be shared with expectant parents. The law does
not require obstetricians to disclose the information or the risks of a
procedure such as this unless the risks to the mother are objectively
“material.”172 Consequently, our expectant couple is likely to remain
ignorant of this information, despite it being undeniably “material”
to them.
D. Induction of Labor and Epidurals
This should, but likely will not, lead the obstetrician into a dis-
cussion about the common induction drug, Pitocin (synthetic oxytocin),
and the common epidural drug Marcaine (Bupivacaine), for the hospi-
161. GOER, supra note 10, at 99.
162. Id. at 103.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 105.
165. Id. at 103.
166. See id. at 99.
167. GOER, supra note 10, at 100.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 100–01. One need not worry about involuntary rupture of the amniotic mem-
branes, however, because “full-term babies can compensate.” Id. at 101.
170. Id. at 101.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 105.
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tal will likely be “required” to administer them.173 Epidurals are the
“Cadillac of anesthesia,” and friends and family would think it crazy
not to have one.174 The truth is that labor induction drugs, and the
epidurals that usually follow, are quite harmful and unnatural, both
for mother and for baby.175
As Henci Goer observes, inducing labor is intrinsically ironic.176
Labor is such a delicate and biologically balanced hormonal symphony
that any attempt to begin the process artificially  often ends in Cesar-
ean section.177 What’s the hurry?
One answer is that obstetricians often induce labor upon concern
for the fetus.178 This too is ironic as induced labor is more strenuous on
the fetus than natural birth and causes many of the problems it was
meant to prevent.179 This is largely due to the injudicious use and quan-
tity of the induction drugs involved: Pitocin, Prostin E2, Prepidil and
Cervidil.180 All of these drugs are known for causing painful and elon-
gated contractions (uterine hyperstimilation).181
Another answer is rooted in the infamous “twenty-four hour
rule.”182 The twenty-four hour rule effectively says that if the expectant
mother has experienced a measured, but only slight amount of dilation
in the twenty-four hour period since her water spontaneously broke or
was unnaturally broken by an amniotomy, obstetricians are authorized
to give the woman drugs to induce labor in an effort to minimize the
risk of infection to the unborn child.183 Studies that initially supported
this rule as the basis for hospital policies have been found to be seri-
ously flawed.184 This is not the full conversation with regard to induc-
tion medications, but explicates some of the economic forces that drive
decisions in hospitals.185
Another explanation for induction is for the convenience of the
mother and also for the physician.186 All too often, upon hearing word
173. See GOER, supra note 10, at 50–51 (discussing the unnecessary interventions by
hospitals to induce and deliver infants absent adequate medical necessity, largely for
reasons of obstetrician convenience).
174. See id. at 126.
175. Id. at 126–27.
176. See id. at 51.
177. Id. at 52.
178. Id. at 50.
179. GOER, supra note 10, at 50.
180. Id. at 50–51.
181. Id. at 51.
182. Id. at 52.
183. Id. at 52–53.
184. Id. at 53.
185. See GOER, supra note 10, at 16–17.
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that her obstetrician will be leaving town, the mother elects induc-
tion.187 Induction is also used to prevent the mother from being
“[o]verdue,” which, in the words of Henci Goer, is like “overbaking
a cake.”188 So how can this be in the mother’s best interests? More im-
portantly, why are expectant mothers being insulated from receiving
this information?
Regardless of the reason for the induction, almost always part and
parcel is the epidural. Almost all of the common induction drugs unfor-
tunately cause uterine hyperstimulation, which sends a woman’s nerve
endings into overdrive.189 Accordingly, the administration of the
induction-drug Pitocin makes labor extremely painful, while doubling
the odds of a negative fetal outcome.190 Enter the epidural.
The very first epidural was administered in 1885, when a New
York neurologist injected cocaine into a patient’s back in an effort to re-
lieve pain.191 Today, “[e]pidurals involve the injection of [drugs] into the
epidural space.”192 Bupivacaine, Ropivacaine and Lidocaine are tradi-
tionally used, all of which are derivatives of cocaine.193 Although an
epidural does substantially eviscerate the pain of labor,194 and the pain
amplified by the induction drugs, it has two significant consequences.
First, “[epidural drugs] can cause profound, prolonged drops in
babies’ heart rates.”195 The drop can occur within thirty minutes of the
epidural being administered to the mother and last as long as twenty
minutes.196 All too often, the fetus develops bradycardia, a neonate
condition characterized by a very low-level fetal heart rate.197
It is critical to remember that the labor and birth processes are
biologically orchestrated, and complex with hormones. Epidurals
violently interfere with this natural process in the mother.198 Oxytocin,
for example, is a natural hormone that causes contractions within the
uterus.199 As discussed, sometimes Pitocin (synthetic oxytocin) is
administered to supplement the mother’s natural oxytocin and unnatu-
rally induce labor. Epidurals, however, which are administered to
187. Id.
188. Id. at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted).
189. Id. at 64–66.
190. Id. at 65.
191. SARAH J. BUCKLEY, GENTLE BIRTH, GENTLE MOTHERING: A DOCTOR’S GUIDE TO
NATURAL CHILDBIRTH AND GENTLE EARLY PARENTING CHOICES 132 (2009).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 132, 138.
194. Id. at 133.
195. GOER, supra note 10, at 126.
196. BUCKLEY, supra note 191, at 142.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 133–35.
199. Id. at 133.
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eviscerate the pain now amplified by the synthetic oxytocin, lower the
mother’s release of natural oxytocin and block its intended induction
effect if administered prior to labor.200 As Dr. Sarah J. Buckley ob-
serves: “Epidurals also obliterate the maternal oxytocin peak that oc-
curs at birth—possibly the highest oxytocin activity of a mother’s
lifetime—that catalyzes the final powerful contractions of labor . . .
helping [the mother] fall in love with her baby at first meeting.”201
This brings us to the second significant consequence of epidural
administration.
Once a woman has received an epidural, labor will necessarily be
slowed as the epidural decreases her natural oxytocin and effectively
offsets any Pitocin (synthetic oxytocin) she has received.202 Although
now pain-free, synthetic oxytocin will need to be administered, or re-
administered, to ensure the mother’s delivery progresses.203 Failure to
combat this slowing of labor caused by the epidural can lead to the
need for forceps or vacuuming.204 Doris Haire explains the effect of
synthetic oxytocin (Pitocin) on the baby: “The situation is analogous
to holding an infant under the surface of the water, allowing the infant
to come to the surface to gasp for air, but not to breathe.”205
Adding depth and context, however, is the foregoing revelation
that “[t]he FDA does not guarantee the safety of any [approved]
drug.”206 Additionally, federal regulations permit the prescribing of off-
label uses in which the drug does not have a specific approval.207 More-
over, no conclusive studies on Pitocin (synthetic oxytocin) have ever
been produced that identify the effect of the drug on the baby’s future
development.208 The same is of course also true of Marcaine (Bupiv-
acaine), the drug used in epidurals.209 But for the obstetrician’s disclo-
sure, how else would expectant parents know?
What is significant is not simply the horrific consequences of these
procedures and drugs, but rather that obstetricians fail to tell us about
them.210 Henci Goer suggests the reason is “mindset, money, or igno-
rance.”211 Mindset, in that many obstetricians see things as black-and-
white and actually believe that epidurals shield newborns from fetal
200. Id. at 133–34.
201. Id. (footnotes omitted).
202. BUCKLEY, supra note 191, at 135.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 111 (footnote omitted).
206. Letter from Dr. J. Richard Crout to Doris B. Haire, supra note 109, at 3.
207. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(9)(ii) (2006).
208. Pitocin (Oxytocin) Injection, DAILY MED, http://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/
drugInfo.cfm?id=6365 (last updated Jan. 2008).
209. Bupivacaine (Bupivacaine Hydrochloride) Injection, Solution, supra note 119.
210. GOER, supra note 10, at 126.
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distress brought on by a natural childbirth.212 Money, in that induction
drugs and epidurals bring in huge revenue for obstetricians and hospi-
tals.213 And ignorance, in that obstetricians themselves may be under
misinformation or belief.214 Regardless of the reason, it is quite clear
that physicians should be obligated to disclose the nature and risks of
drugs and procedures in the field of obstetrics. After all, such informa-
tion is likely to be “material” to the expectant mother.
E. The Ultrasound Procedure
The exchange between the expectant mother and her obstetrician
should also flow to other procedures that are common during the preg-
nancy. Expectant parents should be advised regarding the use of ultra-
sound. It should not be assumed that a mother will simply submit
herself to ultrasound or that the risks associated with it are too trivial
to have an effect on her decision-making.
Ultrasound is a procedure that uses ultra–high frequency sound
waves to scan bones, soft tissue, or fluids by producing an echo which
creates a patterned image that can be used for diagnostic purposes.215
Although the procedure has its roots in World War II when it was
used by warships to detect enemy submarines, ultrasound “has be-
come a rite of passage for pregnant women in most developed coun-
tries.”216 In the United States, nearly seventy percent of pregnant
women are scanned,217 and in Europe the figure is as high as ninety-
eight percent.218
Although ultrasound can be useful if and when specific problems
are expected, concerns loom about its safety.219 The simple fact is that
no studies have conclusively shown the effect of ultrasound waves upon
the unborn child’s future development.220 Obstetricians know that ul-
trasound waves cause heating and cavitation of the scanned area.221
212. Id. at 126–27.
213. Id. at 128. Epidural charges “range from $500 to $2500.” Id. Accordingly to one
hospital consultant, “[i]n order for [some] doctors to make what they consider adequate in-
come, the hospital has to [keep] an 80 percent epidural rate.” Id. at 128.
214. GOER, supra note 10, at 128.
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218. Sarah J. Buckley, Ultrasound Scans—Cause for Concern?, KINDRED (June 5, 2008),
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They also know humans exposed to ultrasound have had side ef-
fects, including premature ovulation, dyslexia, and delayed speech
development.222
Consequently, ultrasound appears slightly effective at best, and
tragic at worst.223 But with seventy percent of expectant Americans and
nearly every expectant European subscribing to the procedure, it is
hard to believe that obstetricians are disclosing these accompanying
risks. This appears to be yet another missed opportunity and another
failure on part of the obstetrician to obtain the expectant parents’
informed consent.
F. Electronic Fetal Monitoring
Much like ultrasound usage, the practice of affixing electronic fetal
monitoring (EFM) equipment to the mother has become standard prac-
tice in obstetrical care.224 Although expectant parents are almost cer-
tainly told that EFM equipment is helpful in monitoring fetal heart
rate,225 the risks are equally worth mentioning. Unfortunately, despite
the established premise that a mother can be the only true advocate for
her unborn child, the “downsides” to the EFM procedure are unlikely
topics for discussion during the prenatal visits.226
The truth about EFM is that the technology was developed to pro-
vide continuous tracing of the fetal heartbeat because it was believed
that conventional intermittent listening was likely to miss changes in
fetal heart rate, which might lead to fetal distress.227 This is one of the
major reasons “EFM swept the marketplace.”228 EFM equipment, how-
ever, has high rates of false positives, either from halving or doubling
the baby’s heartbeat or picking up the mother’s pulse; the occurrence
of these false positives is believed to contribute to the high number of
Cesareans.229 Obstetricians getting a false positive from the EFM think
the baby is in distress and perform a Cesarean section, when, in reality,
everything is normal, and the baby is not in medical jeopardy.230
222. Id. at 88.
223. Id. at 78.
224. Myra Gerson Gilfix, Electronic Fetal Monitoring: Physician Liability and Informed
Consent, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 31, 31–32 (1984).
225. See GOER, supra note 10, at 86.
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As of 1995, eighty-one percent of all pregnant American women re-
ported receiving EFM, perhaps because of the liability issue.231 Hospital
administrators assert that EFMs provide exculpatory documentation
in the event of a malpractice action, and obstetricians claim that EFMs
are the societal norm or standard of care.232
Although some hospitals have wireless EFM equipment, most do
not, and the mother must remain in bed to stay hooked up to equip-
ment in a horizontal position.233 The decision whether to use an inter-
nal or external EFM is another area of consideration.234 The main
difference is that an internal EFM requires that the equipment be di-
rectly connected to the fetus.235 While this fact is seemingly innocuous,
to perform an internal EFM, the obstetrician must perform the am-
niotomy if the membranes have not already naturally broken.236 This
in turn sets off a “cascad[ing] effect,” which can be nightmarish for
the unprepared mother and, yet, at the very same moment, extremely
lucrative to the hospital and obstetrician.237
Recall the twenty-four hour rule, which authorizes obstetricians to
administer induction drugs if the expectant mother has experienced a
measured, but only slight amount of dilation in the twenty-four hour
period since her water spontaneously broke or since her amniotomy.238
The rule seems almost certain to be implicated because the EFM
confines a woman to a horizontal position not conducive to facilitating
delivery, particularly if she has an internal EFM.239
Once the twenty-four hour rule is met, the obstetrician will likely
sound the fetal distress “alarm,” and the mother will be told that she
is not progressing fast enough.240 Under the guise of emergency autho-
rization, the obstetrician may then require that she receive Pitocin
(synthetic oxytocin) to stimulate the cervix and induce the labor fully.241
Because Pitocin also stimulates nerve endings, the mother’s level of
pain will increase dramatically, so much so that the epidural begins
to sound like a good idea.242 Unfortunately for the mother, the Marcaine
(Bupivacaine) epidural injection will reduce the pain,243 but will also
231. GOER, supra note 10, at 88–89.
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offset the Pitocin, as well as her natural oxytocin, and may slow
down labor.244 Depending on how slow the mother progresses, the
use of the epidural could result “in a [C]esarean section for poor
progress or fetal distress.”245
Recall that many obstetricians will not perform a normal, vag-
inal birth after a Cesarean section because many insurers view it as a
dangerous risk and will only cover the birth if it is performed by cesar-
ean.246 Consequently, the cascading ends with a mother who is effec-
tively uninsurable for natural, vaginal birth and thus may at best be
forever plagued to have Cesareans.247
There is no doubt that the law requires a physician to have the
patient’s informed consent prior to the administration of a drug or pro-
cedure, subject to only a couple of well-established exceptions. This
means “material risks,” risks likely to affect a mother’s decision to ob-
tain or forego a treatment or procedure, must be disclosed. Without
these effects and consequences being sufficiently explained to expectant
mothers, how can consent to these procedures possibly be informed?
There is no doubt that expectant parents should hear about these prac-
tices, which are standard in virtually every hospital.
CONCLUSION
The obvious and recurring question is why. Why are such seem-
ingly material risks of drugs and procedures unconscionably being
withheld from expectant mothers by obstetricians? Without a doubt,
every mother would expect to be told the preceding information, yet
so few actually receive it. Supplementing the explanations above, the
answer yields from diverse roots.
At the most basic level, obstetricians fail to inform because the
law allows them to. Indeed, courts have expressed that only material
risks need be disclosed and this necessarily implies that a whole cat-
egory of risks need not be disclosed. Perhaps the informational truth
is unknown to some incompetent practitioners and, as such, they lack
the ability to valuably inform patients on the risks. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that physicians are indifferent to the duty to inform. After all,
they do not get paid for the procedure if the mother says “no.”
Logic demands that few physicians will employ the dictates of the
duty to inform beyond what the law requires because doing so expo-
nentially increases the likelihood that their patients, both mother and
244. Id.
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baby, will elect not to have a particular drug or procedure. The eco-
nomic engine driving hospitals and doctors to administer drugs and
perform procedures is therefore threatened by the doctrine of informed
consent. It appears that a substantial reason our expectant couple
failed to receive the whole truth is because the industry profits greatly
when the parents-to-be are in the dark.
Although economically self-serving hospital policies are a clear
culprit for a weak duty to inform in obstetrical practices, equally as
significant is the fact that many of the risks to mother and child asso-
ciated with common obstetrical drugs and procedures are both hor-
rific and unknown. Quite simply, it appears that practitioners do not
want expectant parents to know how much doctors themselves do not
understand about the very drugs and procedures they administer to
patients. Without a doubt, the duty to inform in obstetrical practices
is in peril. With practitioners reluctant to disclose off-label uses and
areas of uncertainty associated with drugs and procedures, expectant
parents are merely getting the tip of the informational iceberg. It is im-
perative, therefore, that the duty to inform in obstetrics be strength-
ened through our legislatures and courts to safeguard the lives of
mother and child.
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